Finite state automata: Dynamic task environments in problem solving research. by Buchner, Axel & Funke, Joachim
THE QUARTERLY IOUKNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. IW3. * M (I) BJ-llf 
Finite-state Automata: 
Dynamic Task Environments 
in Problem-solving Research 
Axel Buchner and Joachim Funke 
Bonn University. F.R.G. 
This paper presents a new research paradigm for analysing human learning 
in dynamic task environments based o n the theory of finite-stare automata. 
S o m e of the advantages of the approach are out l ined (1) H if possible 10 
design classes of formally well-described dynamic task environments instead 
c i idiosyncratic microworWs that arc difficult if not impossible t o compare . 
( 2 ) T h e approach suggests assumptions about the mental representation o f 
a discrete dynamic system. (3) T h e finite-stale automata formalism suggests 
systematic and appropriate diagnostic procedures. (4) Using finite-slate 
automata to design dynamic task environments, one does not have t o give 
up the "ecological val id i ty" appeal of computer-s imulated scenarios. 
A n experiment on the utility of an external memory support system with 
system complexity and type o f memory support as independent variables a 
f epOTtcd \ o ttlusvr&u the appttcaiiou <A i b e format f ramework. Systematically 
derived dependent variables reflect both system knowledge and control 
performance. T h e results suggest that the benefits due t o the availability of 
the external aid vary as a function of the complex i ty o f the task. A l s o , using 
reaction time measurements, priming phenomena have been found that point 
to the importance o f sequent ia l l y in the representation of discrete systems. 
It is concluded that the approach, although not entirely new in experimental 
psychology, awaits further explorat ion in research on human learning in 
dynamic task «vr i«*unv«\ tv atui promises to be a stimulating pftra&gm for 
both basic and applied research. 
Requests (or reprints should be seal to Ate ' Buchner or Joachim Funke. Department 
of Psychology. Bonn University. RdmctstraBe 164. D-5300 Bonn 1. F.R.G. E-Mail: 
: PSI IM'Xibm thr/ unl-bonn.de (Buchner]. l / PSMl&ibm rhrr_ani-bonn.de {Funke) 
Tnti research n > supported by a grant from i f * Coramiuion of the European Community 
(£S?RTT basic Research Action #3219). We would like to i n i n i Dotuud E. Broadbcm 
(Oxford). Edgar Erdfddcr (Bonn}. Jens Beck ma nn (Leipzig), and two anonymous reviewers 
for their very valuable and helpful com men l i on an earlier draft of ihi* papci We are also 
grateful to Lothar Schmilt for piogiarnmimt: MacFAUST. and to Beat* Nikclowski for her 
assistance wiih data collection 
© 1993 The Experimental Psychology Society 
B4 BUCMNEH AND FUNKE 
The purpose of I his paper i* twofold: (1) We wish to introduce human 
interaction with finite-state automata as a new research paradigm for 
studying processes of knowledge acquisition and knowledge application in 
dynamic task environments. (2) In order to illustrate the approach, a study 
will be reported in which finite-state automata were used as dynamic task 
environments. The study aimed at investigating the usefulness of an 
external memory aid in exploring and controlling a device. 
Using computet emulated scenarios in problem-solving research has be-
come increasingly popular during the last decade (e.g. Berry & Broadbent. 
1984, 1987. 1988; Brehmer. 1987; Broadbem. Fitzgerald. & Broadbent, 
1989; Dorner, 1987; Funke. 1988, 1991; Hayes & Broadbent, 1988; Hoc, 
1989; Hunt & Rouse, 1981; Jeffries. Poison. & Rasran. 1977; Moray. 
Lootsteen. & Pajak. 1986; Morris & Rouse, 1985; Plotzncr, Spada. 
Stumpf, & Opwis, 1990; Putz-Osterloh & Lerrone. 1987; Sanderson. 1989). 
This approach to problem solving seems attractive for several reasons. In 
contrast to static problems, computer-simulated scenarios provide the 
unique opportunity to study human problem-solving behaviour when the 
task environment changes concurrently. Subjects can manipulate a specific 
scenario via a number of input variables (their number typically ranging 
from 2 to 20. and in some exceptional instances up to 2000), and they 
observe the system's state changes in a number of output variables. In 
exploring and/or controlling a system, subjects have to acquire con-
tinuously and use knowledge about the internal structure of the system 
Computer-simulated "microworlds" seem to possess what is called "eco-
logical validity". Simulations of (simplified) industrial production (e.g. 
Moray et al.. 1986), medical systems (e.g. Broadbent. Berry, & Gardner. 
1990), or political processes (e.g. Dorner, 1987) have the appeal of bringing 
"real-world tasks" to (he laboratory. This has stimulated the use of a great 
diversity of dynamic systems as experimental task environments, each of 
which is designed to relate to a different aspect of "reality". The problem, 
however, is that such vastly different experimental tasks, and, hence, the 
results of experiments using these tasks, are very difficult to compare. In 
particular, it becomes unclear as to whether one should attribute experi-
mental findings to the experimenter's manipulation or. rather, to the 
peculiarities of the task employed. Most systems differ not only with 
respect to surface features (i.e. the semantics implied by the labelling of 
their input and output variables), which we know to have strong influences 
on problem-solving behaviour in both static tasks (e.g. Kotovsky & 
Fallside, 1989; Novick. 1988; Wagenaar, Keren. & Lichtcnstein, 1988) and 
dynamic ones (e.g. Hesse, 1982; Put2-Ostertoh. 1990). Equally important, 
for most systems it is unclear how one should compare them with respect 
to the underlying formal structure. 
There arc two possible solutions to the latter problem. One possibility 
is to define a set of formal dynamic system characteristics and use this set 
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for systematically comparing the tasks used in various experiments (e.g 
Funke. 1990). Such an analysis will at least give a rough idea of whether 
or not two dynamic tasks could yield comparable results. The other poss-
ibility is to derive different dynamic task environments from the same 
formal background. The formal homogeneity of different task environ-
ments facilitates comparisons between experiments and increases the 
chances of discovering effects that are not only "local". 
The theoretical framework we refer to is the cybernetic theory of finite-
state automata (cf. Ashby. 1956: Hopcrof! & Ullmann, 1979; Roberts. 
1976; SaJomaa, 1985). We wish to show that, from the perspective of 
cognitive psychology, the paradigm of investigating human interaction with 
finite-state automata has several interesting aspects. These arc mentioned 
here and discussed in greater detail further on. (1) The theory of finite-state 
automata may serve as a basis for constructing classes of formally well-
described dynamic task environments. A s a consequence, it becomes pos-
sible to construct different problems that may share well-known properties 
and differ with respect to a critical feature. (2) The formal description of 
finite-state automata suggests interesting assumptions about plausible 
cognitive processes and forms of mental representation necessary to control 
a discrete dynamic system effectively. (3) The same formalism suggests 
appropriate and systematic diagnostic procedures that closely correspond 
to the assumptions about mental representation. (4) Using finite-state auto-
mata, one does not have to give up the "ecological validity" appeal of more 
conventional dynamic task environments. 
Formal Background 
Finite-state automata theory is a well-elaborated framework in the area of 
computer science. Here, however, we make use only of the framework's 
most elementary concepts. Within finite-state automata theory, any system 
can be defined and exhaustively described by a transformation function 
that specifies the state transitions given a specific stale of the system. In 
this paper we focus on deterministic automata. A deterministic finite-state 
automaton is defined by three sets and fwo funcfioos: 
1. a finite set X of input signals (the input alphabet); 
2. a finite set Y of output signals (the output alphabet); 
3. a finite set 5 of slates; 
4. a transition function 8, which is a mapping of S x X on 5 and which 
determines the next state of the system as a consequence of the input 
signal; 
5. a result function X, which is a mapping of S x X on V and which 
determines the output signal of the system as a consequence of the input 
sismal. 
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The automaton A • [X, Y, S. 8, k\ is called a deterministic Mealy-auto-
maiort (see Figure 1). T o make things more concrete, the input alphabet 
of an arbitrary technical device consists of the button and switch position* 
that can be selected as input at a certain point in time. The output alphabet 
contains all possible display settings. It is assumed in the above definition 
that the system works on the basis of a discrete rime scale. At each point 
in time, the system is in a certain state in which it receives exactly one 
input signal (e.g. on a V C R , the "fast forward" button is pressed). The 
system then moves to the next state, which is determined by the transition 
function d (e.g. the V C R starts to wind the video tape). Subsequently, the 
device emits exactly one output signal, which is determined by the result 
function A as a consequence of the current state and the input signal (e.g. 
the "fast forward" arrows on the V C R ' s front display -are highlighted). 
Note that in this general version the output signal is informative about 
both the next system state and the input signal (and. hence, about Ihe 
previous system state). To illustrate this with another example, an error 
message of a computer program typically contain* information about both 
the present state and the previous state. Thus, the same state s t S (e.g. 
a fatal system error) may be associated with a number of different output 
signals y < Y (e.g. error messages), depending on what preceded the trans-
ition to that state. 
A n automaton in which the output signal y « Y depends only on the 
new state s « S as determined by 5(s. x) (i.e. y is not a direct function of 
the input signal x * X) is called a deterministic Moore automaton. In this 
case a marker function u. exists, which is a mapping of S on Y. replacing 
the result function A. In other words, the output signal contains information 
only about the state of ihe system following the intervention (e.g. that a 
system error has occurred), and not how one got there (e.g. which type 
of error caused the computer to crash). Numbers displayed on a pocket 
calculator may also serve as everyday examples for this situation, The digits 
in the calculator's display do not unambiguously inform us about the cal-
culator's previous state and the last input. Thus, in a Moore automaton, 
an output signal is less informative, because it only reflects the current 
state of the system. This is an important system characteristic to keep in 
mind in constructing dynamic task environments. Naturally, in any realistic 
automaton both forms of output signals may coexist. Figure 1 illustrates 
in the simplest possible case the formal difference between Moore and 
Mealy types of automata. 
T w o convenient ways of describing finite-stale automata are used: state 
transition matrices and directed graphs. Each possible description of hnite-
statc automata puts a different emphasis on certain aspects of system 
behaviour. Knowing about these differences is helpful in constructing 
dynamic task environments. A state transition matrix contains in its cells 
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FIG I. Directed graph* iral Male tnuraticm matrices iDuiiming )•) a Mealy and (b) a 
Moore automaton. SI and S2 represent the two states of the automaton. II and 12 rcprcacM 
the input signals, and lower-case teucr* represent ihe output signals 
ihe automaton's stale at time / + I (S,. , , the next state), given a specific 
state at time t (S„ the current state) and a specific input signal at time t 
(/,. the user intervention). In each column it contains the "function" of an 
input signal, and ihe rows reflect possible next states given a certain current 
state. 
Figure I also shows that every deterministic automaton may be un-
ambiguously described by a directed graph D with D = (V , OPE), where 
V is a set of vertices (states, nodes) and OPE is a set of ordered pairs of 
elements of V called arcs (state transitions, edges). For small automata, 
directed graphs are a particularly useful tool for visualizing the auiomata's 
functional characteristics.1 
Another form of describing the characteristics of a finite-state auto-
maton (not illustrated in Figure I) is a tree. A tree is an ordered graph 
consisting of a "source" node from which hierarchical "branches'" to 
successor nodes originate. The source node represents the initial slate of 
the system. Successor nodes are all states thai can possibly be reached 
from the current node by any of the available interventions. The "leaves" 
associated with the branches represent the output signals of ihe system 
'In addition, graph theory provide! certain (deacnpttve) concepu (ot cftanscteruinj tlnitc-
statc automata, such as different forms ot connectedness or arc-vulnerability Roughly, (ot 
instance, arc-vulnerability describe* the degree to which there exist alternative sea of Hate 
tranviiom thai may be used if one set of trantitiom it no longer available to gel a system 
from a specific naie 5, to another specific state S „ . Thb may happen, for instance, due to 
a system failure or because of forgetting on the Mde of Ibc user. The smaller the number of 
alternatives, ihe more vulnerable the system u relative to the S,-SM. transition (for further 
details, x * Roberts. 1976) 
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associated with the slate transitions. Tt\eie aie as many levels of branches 
as there are interventions to be considered. Thus, the branches of the tree 
reflect the accumulated state transitions of the system. One reason for 
using trees lo visualize the structure of an automaton may be to illustrate 
quickly the decisions a person has to face in interacting with the system. 
The cases considered so far involve only user-generated state transitions 
However, siate transitions may also occur autonomously (i.e. not caused 
by direct user interventions). Autonomous transitions occur as a function 
of discrete time intervals. As an everday example of such time-dependent 
transitions, consider an automatic ticket vendor that ejects the inserted 
money if no user input occurs within a certain lime interval, In order to 
represent time-dependent transitions, one can simply add a separate 
column to the transition matrix analogous to a new input signal. This new 
column contains for each state as parameters not only the next system state 
S,ri but also the length of the time interval after which the specified state 
transition will occur (unless, of ixmrsc. the user selected a different inter-
vention before the end of the time interval). 
Transparency as an important system characteristic depends on the 
nature and the number of latent states implemented in a system. A state 
i» said to be latent if, for instance, a state transition to this state results in 
an output signal identical to the signal of the preceding transition. A ticket 
vendor that does not emit information about how much money has been 
inserted can serve as a simple example. After each coin inserted, the system 
*v&\t change*, but the output signal stay* constant. Roughly speaking, the 
larger the number of different states that share the same output signal, the 
less transparent the system will appear to the person trying to interact with 
it-
Attractive Features o f the Discrete S y s t e m s 
P a r a d i g m 
The paradigm of human interaction with (mite-state automata has a 
number of attractive features for studying processes of knowledge acquisi-
tion and knowledge application in dynamic task environments. These fea-
tures, which have already been mentioned, are described here in greater 
detail. 
/. Constructing Classes of Well-described Dynamic Task Environ-
ments. This is an important aspect, as manipulating the properties of task 
environments seems essential for experimental cognitive psychology. Yet 
in the area of problem-solving research this aspect has often been neg-
lected. Instead, what we find is a collection of simulated scenarios, most 
of which have been constructed to "mimic" some aspect of reality more 
or less adequately- These scenarios—and, hence, the results of experiments 
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employing them—can hardly be compared, and it • difficult to manipulate 
isolated properties of unsystemaiically constructed "realistic" scenarios 
(see e.g Brehmcr. Leplat. & Rasmussen. 1991). One reason for this deficit 
is that the appropriate formal criteria are not readily available. 
Systematically varying and controlling the properties of task environ-
ments helps (o detect effects that are unique to a specific task, and it may. 
at the same time, serve to estimate the impact of these properties on 
processes of knowledge acquisition and application Within the theory of 
finite-state automata [he tools are available for exhaustively describing 
different discrete dynamic systems on the basis of the same formalism. 
This facilitates both system comparisons and systematic variations of single 
task properties. A concrete example may be system complexity. System 
complexity is determined by the number of states a device can be in. and 
by the number of interventions with different consequences possible for a 
given system state. The number of different interventions corresponds to 
the number of potential user decisions given that state. For each state, the 
number of different interventions may vary between 1 (a "trivial" case in 
which all input signals have the same consequence) and the number of 
input signals available (each input signal has a different consequence) 
McCabe (1976), for instance, has introduced a complexity measure that 
takes into account these parameters that together define the decisional 
structure inherent in a system. This complexity measure may be used to 
characterize the overall complexity of automata. Considering the graphical 
representation G ot a (uute-state automaton with n states, t edges, and p 
connected components, complexity C is defined as 
C(<7) * € - n + 2 • p 
Asp is different from 1 only for hierarchically nested automata (a case 
that is irrelevant for our present purpose), we can say that for the extremely 
simple example in Figure 1 we find e * 4 edges and n = 2 states, resulting 
in C = 4 — 2 + 2 * 1 = 4 . This figure may then be used to make ordinal 
comparisons between different automata.1 McCabe's measure is applied 
to the automata used in our experiments. 
Of course, experimental research using dynamic task environments roust 
not exhaustively focus on the variation of formal properties of task environ-
ments. However, formal properties may serve as a first basis for inter-
preting psychologically interesting effects (such as differences in the 
amount of knowledge acquired) and as a stimulant for interesting experi-
'C Ukei on • minimal value of I (Or u i i m n i u in which all interventions that are possible 
a! i given ttaie lead to the tame next tUtc. The gzaah at «och automata, uke* on the farm. 
r>f a chain, leading in a itraight line from the initial Hale via all intermediate uaies to the 
terminal Male. HentX. the number of states n surpasses ihe numbci of edges < by exactly ] , 
t h u < C - ( f l - l ) - * - f 2 = | . 
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mcnls, particularly if subjects' performance deviates from what would be 
expected °n formal grounds. 
2. plausible Cognitive Processes and Forms of Menial Representation 
The formal descriptions of automata also provide a basis for selecting 
plausible psychological hypotheses about their mental representation and 
about processes of knowledge acquisition. The user's knowledge about a 
system can p^ described m terms of those parts of the transition matrix 
that are represented in memory and available for guiding system inter-
vention*' We call this the person's "individual transition matrix" (ITM). 
The person * ITM may. of course, deviate from the automaton's transition 
matrix because it is incomplete or because it contains incorrect transitions 
If a person is confronted with a previously unknown automaton and 
begins to explore this device, learning about the functioning of it must 
begin a< 'he level of individual state transitions composed of a previous 
state, a« intervention, and a next slate. A person's experiences of these 
transitions while exploring the automaton constitute the "entries" for the 
ITM At that level, the signals belonging to different states, interventions, 
and ne.<t states must become associated. Figure 2 illustrates the necessary 
associations between the basic components of individual state transitions. 
(I) We assume that a system state becomes associated to a specific inter-
vention (F,) as a consequence of the feedback provided by the subsequent 
state o* the system. Such an association could be the learning to press a 
stop switch in an emergency situation. (2) The intervention itself may be 
associated with a specific subsequent system state (F2). Pressing the off-
switch a device, for instance, will be strongly related to the subsequent 
terminal state. (3) States may be directly associated to subsequent states 
(ft) , particularly if there is only a limited choice of possible interventions, 
if the choice of an intervention does not matter to the state transition, or 
if the transition occurs autonomously (i.e. as a function of a discrete time 
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interval without an explicit user intervention). (4) We need to consider 
associations of subsequent interventions as a component association that 
should be important when output signals of the system arc not attended 
Following manual or cookbook instructions may seive as a proto-
typical example in this context. 
In analogy to paired associate learning findings (cf. Martin, 1965) we 
may expect both forward and backward associations to be formed (the 
latter arc referred to as flj to B4 in Figure 2). However, forward associ-
ations should be dominant, as free exploration of an automaton results in 
a more serial learning type of experience. In contrast, paired associate 
learning experiments that find strong backward associations typically ran-
domize the order of presentation of the pairs of stimuli from trial to trial, 
thus preventing serial learning from playing an important role (e.g. 
Harcum. 1953: Murdock. 1956, 1958; Ricliardson. 1960). 
Of course, combinations of component associations will be relevant 
depending on the situation. For instance, associations F3 and F> are 
relevant for predicting the next system state given the present state and 
an intervention. In making such a prediction, the current state and a 
specified intervention may be combined in short-term memory to form a 
"compound cue" (Cillund & Shiffrin, 1984) to retrieve the next state of 
the system. 
Later on in the process of learning, people may no longer primarily use 
knowledge about individual state transition-, to control a device. Instead, 
they will cluster individual state transitions into more abstract concepts 
according to. for instance, the statistical properties of the elements of the 
state transitions (e.g. co-occurrence of a subset of output signals with a 
specific subset ol input signals) in order to reduce memory load 
We can distinguish two different ways of organizing clusters ol state 
transitions. (1) "Routines" may be developed to get a system reliably from 
one state to a distant state. This can be referred to as the formation of 
"horizontal chunks" of state transitions, For example, the state transition 
sequence AWoS..i-A-r-S<»r-A.r-Sr»> may be reduced to the form S,-[/,-
/,. |-/,. i\S„ f where the interventions necessary to get from state S, to S„, 
form one single component of a compound state transition and the user 
no longer needs 10 attend to the intermediate output signals (e.g. 
Anderson, 1982; Frensch, 1991; MacKay. 1982; Newell & Roscnbloom. 
1981). (2) State transitions can be combined across a specific intervention 
or a specific state, given the intervention or the state can be identified as 
the source of a specific form of invariancc This process can be referred 
to as the formation of "vertical chunks" of state transitions. An example 
could be an intervention to change the mode of operation of a device (in 
the most simple case this is an "on/off" switch). 
The concepts induced from the experience of individual state transitions 
arc necessarily more abstract in that they no longer correspond to one 
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single specific physical event in the automaton. For instance, concepts like 
copying, cutting, deleting, and inserting text in a word processor may be 
grouped as editing functions. In a new dynamic task environment, how-
ever, learn ing-by-exploration will start at the level of individual state tran-
sitions, and it seems necessary to understand the process of learning at the 
level of slate transitions before proceeding to a higher level of knowledge 
organization, 
3. Diagnostic Procedures. A frequent practice in problem-solving 
research is to use specifically designed questionnaires or performance 
measures that are directly derived from the task at hand, such as the 
"production output" in an economic scenario. The problem with these 
idiosyncratic measures is rwofold. (I) Again, it is difficult if not impossible 
to compare such measures if they stem from different tasks and use system 
parameters as performance criteria. (2) They have no clear relation to 
"classical" measures of memory, and hence we renounce a considerable 
body of information accumulated about these latter measures (e.g. Posner. 
1978). 
The formalism taken from the theory of finite-state automata provides 
tools for developing adequate and systematic diagnostic procedures. We 
can assume that a person's experiences of state transitions while exploring 
an automaton constitute the "entries" for the ITM. State transitions, in 
turn, consist of a given system state at time t (5,), an intervention at time 
f (/,), and a next system state at time /+1 (5,.,). A straightforward way to 
assess users' representations about a discrete dynamic system, then, is to 
confront them with two elements of this triple and ask for the missing 
element. This results in three basic types of questions that can be asked 
to investigate a given state of knowledge: 
1. Prognostic question: Given state S, and intervention /,. what new state 
5 „ , will result? 
2. Interpolation question: Given slate S, and state S„,, what intervention 
/, does produce this state transition? 
3. Retrognostic question: Given an intervention /, and a resulting state 
S „ „ what was the previous state 5(? 
With these questions it is possible to take "samples'" from the fTM. For 
deterministic discrete systems the answer to Question 1 always has only 
one correct solution. For Questions 1 and 3, however, the actual answer 
may be taken from a set of correct items, depending on the specific char-
acteristics of the automaton. The queslions may be presented in analogy 
to classical direct measures of memory, either in a cued recall situation 
(the person must recall the missing element) or in a recognition procedure 
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(the person must select the missing element from a list of alternatives). 
Also, we have been successful at using variants of these questions that 
constitute indirect measures of system knowledge in that they do not 
require an explicit recollection of the prior learning episode (Buchner. 
1993). 
In addition to presenting only two out of three elements, one can also 
expose subjects to entire state transitions that arc either possible or impos-
sible for a given device and ask for a response indicating the correctness 
of Ihe transiiion. This is similar to a classical verification lask. and both 
reaction time and error rales provide well-known dependent measures. 
A unique feature of dynamic systems tasks is that "control performance" 
provides an additional access to a person's knowledge about a system, For 
evaluating these performance data and for making performance com-
parisons between subjects it is essential to have a criterion for optimal 
performance. This criterion is directly available within the finite-state auto-
mata approach. Given a present state of a discrete system and an arbitrarily 
defined goal state, it is always possible to specify whether there exists a 
sequence of interventions to reach the goal state and, if so. how many and 
what steps constitute an optimal sequence of interventions (i.e. a sequence 
involving a minimal number of steps). 
The finite state automata formalism also suggests other performance 
measures. For instance, subjects' exploration behaviour (I.e. the way they 
approach the knowledge acquisition task) may itself be an Interesting basis 
for additional dependent variables. A readily available indicator of ex-
ploration behaviour is the number of different state transitions explored 
relative to all states in the state transition matrix of the system One can 
assume thai under difficult learning conditions subjects restrict their 
exploratory activities to a smaller number of transitions to build up firm 
knowledge about the device 
4. Ecological Validity. Finally, we want to point out that many tech-
nical systems we deal with in everyday life are adequately described within 
the formalism provided by finite-state automata theory. Examples include 
computer programs, T V sets, programmable VCRs , digital wrist watches, 
banking machines, and so on (see also the examples given by Weir, 1991). 
In addition, consider some highly formalized way of social interaction, For 
instance, everyday experience with administrative processes is that bureau-
cratic institutions accept only a finite set of input signals, take on a finite 
set of stales, and emit a finite set of output signals. Thus, in drawing upon 
a well-developed formalism for constructing dynamic task environments, 
one does not automatically lose the appeal of "ecological validity" that is 
often demanded of psychological research. 
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AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXPERIMENT 
ON THE EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL MEMORY AIDS 
To illustrate the approach outlined above, we briefly present an experiment 
that used finile state automala as dynamic task environments to investigate 
the utility of an external memory for learning about a system. 
Three groups of subjects performed successively on two different 
unknown automata, For each automaton, their task was the following: 
subjects were instructed to explore each automaton on two subsequent 
"exploration phases" and to find out how it worked by manipulating it-
One group performed without additional help. Subjects in each of the two 
remaining groups could use one of two different versions of an external 
memory After both exploration phases, all subjects were confronted with 
a recognition task ("prognostic questions", see earlier discussion) to assess 
their system knowledge, and with a verification task to test a representa-
tional hypothesis (see later discussion). Finally, in a third phase subjects 
were asked to try to reach a specified goal state as often as possible during 
a particular interval ("control phase"). Thereafter, subjects were again 
confronted with the recognition task and the verification task The same 
procedure was repealed with the second automaton. 
Our basic assumption is that learning about a new discrete dynamic-
system starts at the level of individual state transitions (S/-lr-S.~, 
sequences). Later on in the course of learning these state transitions may 
be combined into higher-order units (see earlier). However, as a pre-
requisite they have to be available in working memory to become integ-
rated. The present experiment was designed to test whether an external 
memory that graphically displays past states and interventions would facil-
itate the integration process by expanding the amount of transitions thai 
can be made available to working memory, and whether the external 
memory would reduce interference between the individually experienced 
state transitions that share elements of the S r /V-S,M triple, thereby 
changiug subjects' exploratory behaviour. An additional question was 
whether the usefulness of the external memory would depend on the com-
plexity of the system with which subjects interacted. 
Hypotheses 
The major focus of the experiment was on the utility of an external memory 
aid as one way to support identification of the unknown system structure 
Existing research in this field mostly focuses on conditions that encourage 
people to use external memory aids spontaneously (e.g. Harris. 1980). For 
the most part this seems to be a question of a person's metacogmh've skills 
and the available knowledge about the utility of an external memory aid 
In a particular situation. At leasl adults seem to know fairly well when 
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thev should use which type of external memory aid (cf. In tons-Peterson & 
Fournier. 1986). 
In a novel automaton, learning starts at the level of associating elements 
of state transitions. Particularly at the beginning of the learning process, 
these associations will still be fragmentary. Also, normally there will be a 
number of transitions that share elements of the SrI/~St*} triple. An 
attempt to retrieve a particular transition or a component thereof will 
consequently be susceptible to interference from similar transition?.. For 
instance, given a current state -V, and a desired next state 5, , , , an inter-
vention /, may be retrieved either because it is associated with the current 
state but not with next states different from 5,. ( or because it is associated 
with inn desired next state .V,., but not with the current state. As a con-
sequence, subjects may restrict then exploratory activities to a smaller 
number of transitions in an attempt to reduce this interference. If, in 
contrast, the availability of an external memory aid serves to reduce the 
interference, more different state transitions should be explored (Hypo-
thesis /). As a consequence of a mote extensive exploratory activity, more 
wilt be learned about the structure of the automaton. Thus, subjects sup-
ported by an external memory should perform better both on the recogni-
tion task and on the control task (Hypothesis 2). If this is true, an external 
memory that in addition to preserving past information enables users to 
resume exploration at a part of the state transition matrix they already 
know could further reduce the interference and facilitate a systematic 
expansion of a person's individual state transition matrix, thereby causing, 
an additional performance increase on the recognition task and on the 
control task (Hypothesis 3). 
The two automata used in this experiment differed greatly in complexity 
as defined by formal system characteristics. Assuming that this formal 
property influences the learning rate, we postulate that performance should 
be better on the small automaton than on the complex automaton (Hypo-
thesis 4). It was also of interest whether the utility of the external support 
system was uniform for automata of different complexities. As the external 
memory displays an identical number of state transitions for both auto-
mata, the relative reduction of interference should be much lower for the 
complex automaton. Considering the large difference in complexity 
between the automata (see later discussion), we postulate that the perform-
ance differences specified by Hypotheses 1 and 2 will be present for the 
small automaton but not for the complex automaton (Hypothesis 5). 
A separate question concerns so-called "efficiency-divergency" effects. 
Oesterreich (1981) has suggested that in complex choice situations subjects 
prefer actions that imply more alternatives (more divergent actions) but 
lead to a goal less efficiently, compared to actions that arc more efficient 
but less divergent. We wanted to see whether corresponding results could 
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be found for dynamic task situation* when subjects explore a device under 
conditions of imperfect knowledge They should then prefer to explore 
and, consequently, acquire more knowledge about states that lead to the 
goal stale less quickly bui with a smaller risk of running into a state that 
is further away from the goal than the present state. In contrast, they 
should know less about efficient but less divergent transitions (Hypothesis 
6). _ 
Finally, it was intended to test a representational hypothesis that follows 
from the assumption about the serial learning character of associating state 
transitions. For that purpose, we introduced a verification task in which 
subjects judged whether or noi a given transition was possible for the 
automaton they explored ff the assumption holds, w-e would expect faster 
verification times for the tccond of a pair of state transitions if the pair 
corresponded to the natural sequence of transitions in the automaton. In 
contrast, if the second item of the pair violated the normal sequential!ry, 
no priming benefit should occur {Hypothesis 7), 
The Task 
Two dynamic systems were constructed on the basis of the theory of 
finite-state automata. They were displayed using MacFAUST. ' Mac-
F A U S T provides a standard graphical user interface for many different 
kinds of discrete systems (sec Figure 3). 
During the exploration and control phases, subjects interacted with an 
automaton by clicking with the computer mouse into "input buttons" in 
ihe display A selected button turned grey. For example, on left side of 
Figure 3. the combination "alpha, + , « " has been selected. For each inter-
vention, subjects selected exactly one button in each row of input buttons 
and clicked "OK" when they were satisfied with their choice. Changes of 
selections were possible as long as "OK" had not been clicked, and "OK" 
was active only if one button in each row had been selected. The results 
of the intervention could then be observed in the "output fields" (right 
side of Figure 3) of the display. The input buttons were cleared, and 
subjects could select their next input. 
The two systems used in this experiment were designed lo be com-
parable with respect to most features and yet to differ with respect to their 
degree of complexity. Complexity is supposed to be a major factor 
influencing the difficulty of the identification task and of the utility of the 
external memory support. As a measure of complexity we employed 
'MacFAUST ( - Finite Automata Simulation Tool) runt <*i Apple Macintosh compute" 
and * * rv« to create and experiment with finite ittta l u i o a u u as dynamic la*» environment* 
For a mote detailed description of MacFAUST aec Buchrwr. Scbmiti. Funfce. and Nikerowb 
( W l ) M i e F M J S T « available upOT Ttqvxs 
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McCabes (1976)complexity index (see above). The small automaton has, 
according to this measure, ft complexity of 52 (e = 39 edgr> and n — 9 
states). The complex automaton's complexity is 260 (e = 304 edges and 
n = 46 states). Thus, the automata differ considerably with respect lo the 
decisional complexity implied by their state transition matrices. The slate 
transition matrices for both automata are given in the A.ppet\dix (Tables 
A l and A2). 
Both automata operate like Moore automata. The output signals reflect 
only the system states, and each state is associated with a unique output 
signal (i.e. there are no latent stales). Each automaton has three rows of 
input buttons. In each row. one button must be selected for the complete 
input signal. Also, in both automata the output signal has three com-
ponents (see Figure 3 and Tables AI and A2 in the Appendix). In each 
automaton, one row of input buttons works similarly to an "on/off" switch 
(+/— arid » /o for the small and the complex automaton, respectively) in 
thai ii controls whether or not inputs in the other rows have an effect on 
the system in the sense (hat (hey produce a transition to a 5,. ( SI state, 
where SI is the initial state. For instance, if a person selected " — " in ihe 
second row of the small automaton's input buttons, the following transition 
always resulted In the initial slate, regardless of the setting of the buttons 
in the remaining rows. Another row of input variables worked like a 
"mode" switch (alpha/beta and amount/AAA). Depending on the currcnl 
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setting of this input button, the inputs in the third row have different 
effects. For instance, if the small automaton is in its initial state SI and if 
"alpha" is selected in the first land " + " in the second) row of input buttons, 
the effect of pressing in the third row (12) is that the automaton 
moves to state S2, and " B " is displayed in the bottom component of the 
output signal If "beta" (16) is selected instead of "alpha", the system stays 
in state SI and no change in the output signal occurs following that inter-
vention. 
The exact way of how the automata worked is reflected in the state 
transition matrices (sec Tables A l and A 2 in the Appendix). Roughly, the 
small automaton may be described in analogy to a primitive ticket vendor. 
The user first selects one of two types of cards (e.g. one selects card " B " 
by pressing the combination "alpha,+ which leads to state S2), then 
inserts money (e.g. by selecting "beta,+ , » * * " which leads to state S6). 
and finally tells the machine to eject the card (by selecting "beta.+ 
which leads to the goal state S8). To understand the complex automaton, 
one may think of an automatic teller. The user sets the machine to display 
a certain amount of money (by selecting several times "•.amount", and 
one of the appropriate buttons " A " to " E " ) and then types in one of three 
permissible 3-letter code words to reach the goal (by selecting several times 
" • . A A A " , and one of the appropriate buttons " A " to "E") . Alternatively, 
the user may start to type in the code and then specify the amount of 
money. 
The automata were completely unknown to subjects, and the labels of 
the input and output signals were designed to be semantically poor so as 
to make the task primarily one of structure identification. Subjects should 
not use any specific knowledge they might have had about a concrete 
system to infer the automata'* structures. 
It has frequently been reported that, particularly for novices, surface 
features are crucial for positive transfer between different tasks (e.g. 
Gentner & Centner, 1983; Novick, 1988; Schumacher & Gentncr. 1988). 
Therefore, surface features of the two systems were made dissimilar to 
minimize possible transfer effects between systems. ( I) The labels used for 
the input and output variables and for their levels were changed from one 
system to the other. (2) The spatial positions of the input buttons and the 
output fields on the graphical display were different for both automata. 
The External Memory 
For two ot the three experimental groups, an external memory was 
available during the exploration phase Two different versions of the 
external memory were implemented. Both versions graphically displayed 
six past states at a time in a separate window, and the window automatically 
appeared on the screen every six interventions. The display consisted of 
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scaled-down copies of the original displays and showed the selected input 
buttons, together with the following output signal. An example of the 
external memory for the small automaton is presented in Figure 4. Subjects 
could inspect all past transitions of the current exploration phase by clicking 
into the numbered lop row of the window. The state with the appropriate 
ordinal number and its five predecessors were then displayed in the 
memory window. Subjects clicked into the window's "close box" in the 
top left corner when they wanted to continue to explore the automaton. 
This "static" version of the external memory was presented to one group. 
For another group the external memory additionally included the 
"dynamic" option to make one of the old states displayed in the memorv 
window ihe next present state of the system and to continue system ex-
ploration at thai state. To achieve this, subjects clicked into the part of 
the window displaying the desired next state. They were then asked to 
confirm their decision before the memory window was closed. The auto-
maton then displayed the desired next state as its current state from which 
subjects could continue their exploration. The transition was counted like 
a normal user intervention. 
Knowledge Assessment 
After each interval of 50 interventions, subjects were confronted with 
a recognition test and a verification task. The recognition test consisted of 
10 items, the verification task consisted of 20 items 
pLf l < - Ctlcfc nera lo tonce! 
FIG 4. Example display of the external memory tor the small automaton Al l i nab have 
ordinal numbers, *ith that of the present tnai being the hi|besi. 
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During ihe recognition test the screen display was identical 10 the display 
during the intervention trials, except that the three output signal displays 
were divided horizontally into two separate fields, one of which showed a 
system state .V and the other part was empty. Also, three input buttons 
were shaded grey to indicate an intervention /,. Subjecls' task was to con-
sider the state 5, and the intervention and then to select from a list of 
possible and an equal number of impossible output signals the appropriate 
signal of the next state .*»,., ("prognostic question", see earlier discussion). 
More specifically, for each possible output signal in one of the three com-
ponents there was one impossible alternative. Subjects selected the three 
components by clicking into the output fields. Each dick in one of the 
fields brought up a different output signal component. Subjects clicked 
" O K " when they thought the displayed components commuted the correct 
output signal. 
A complete list of the recognition items for both automata is given m 
Table A 3 in the Appendix. The items did not represent a random sample 
from the state transition matrix but were selected to cover certain 
interesting features of the automaton. For instance. Items 9 and 10 cover 
inputs with a different efficiency-divergency characteristic (see Hypothesis 
6). To illustrate, consider the complex automaton in which two 13 inter-
ventions may replace seven 11 interventions to reach state 535 from the 
initial state SI. On the other side, for intervention 13 there is a higher risk 
of ending up in State S12. from which the distance to the Goal State S45 
is maximal (only resets to the initial state are possible) Thus, as we expect 
that subjects will prefer less efficient but also less "dangerous" (more 
divergent) interventions during their exploration trials, they should end up 
knowing less about the efficient intervention covered by Item 10 in compar-
ison to the less efficient intervention covered by Item 9. We also expect 
them to acquire less knowledge about the "mode" interaction (Items 3 and 
4) than about the "on/off" interaction (Items 5 and 6). 
In the verification task the display was identical to that in the recognition 
task, except that the blank parts of the output signal components showed 
the components of a next system state 5 l M . In other words, a complete 
5,-A—S».t transition was displayed. Subjects judged as fast as possible by 
pressing a "YES" or "NO" key on the keyboard whether a given state 
transition was possible for Ihe automaton they had explored. Half of Ihe 
items were correct transitions. These were automatically selected from the 
subject's prior intervention trials in pairs, such that for three of these pairs 
the second item was a state transition that had occurred after the first item, 
thus corresponding to the "natural" seriality of system state transitions. In 
contrast, two pairs of items were selected such ihat the second item was a 
state transition that had occurred before the first item, thus contradicting 
the normal seriality of state transitions. 
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During the control task subjects interacted with the automaton as during 
the exploration phase, but this time the instruction was to use the shortcsl 
possible sequence of interventions lo reach the goal state (States S8 and 
S45 for the small and the complex automaton, respectively) as often as 
possible within 50 interventions, For the small automaton the optimal 
sequence involves three, for the complex automaton it involves six inter-
ventions Every time the goal state is reached, an additional transition is 
used for the reset to the automaton's initial state. The external memory 
was not available during the control phase. 
A final dependent measure was taken directly from subjects* exploration 
trials. It was counted how many different state transitions subjects generated 
while they attempted to learn how ihe automaton operated. 
Method 
Subjects. Subjects were 68 Bonn University students who cither volun-
teered or participated to fulfil course requirements. Thev were aged 20 to 
40 years. 
Design. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three experi-
mental conditions, these being no memory (NM). static memory (SM), 
and dynamic memory (DM). There were 23 subjects in Groups NM and 
SM, and 22 subjects m Group DM. Because subjects performed on two 
successive automata, one half within each group started with the complex 
automaton, the other half started with the small automaton. 
Procedure. Subjects were tested individually. The instructions were 
read to them in a standardized form and repeated on the computer. All 
subjects received a printed version of the graphical display of the system 
and a description of the course of the experiment. They were instructed 
that they would be confronted with two unknown automata and that their 
task was to Identify how these automata operated. They were told that 
each automaton had one particular goal state and that if they would reach 
this state, the automaton would present a brief signal indicating their 
"success" and would ihen automatically reset itself to the initial state from 
where they could then resume exploration. Subjects in the memory condi-
tions were informed about the external memory and instructed how to 
handle the memory window. Subjects performed about 30 interventions 
on an extremely simple "learning automaton" to become acquainted with 
the use of the computer mouse. 
Each subject then performed on two successive automata. For each 
automaton they carried out two exploration phases and one control phase. 
Each of the exploration phases and the control phase consisted of 50 inter-
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vention trials. During the two exploration phases, subjects' task was to 
learn how the automaton operated by manipulating it and observing the 
state changes. For the memory conditions, the memory window was div 
played automatically every six trials during the two exploration phases. 
In contrast, during the eontrof phase subjects were instructed to try to 
reach the goal state as often as possible None of the groups received 
external support while performing on this task. 
After each exploration phase and after the control phase subjects per-
formed on the recognition task (10 items) and on the verification task (20 
items). The order of presentation of single items was randomized for the 
recognition task. For the verification task, the order of presentation of 
pairs of items (presented in contradicting or corresponding sequence) was 
randomized for each subject After each recognition item, subjects were 
asked to indicate the degree to which they felt their choice was appropriate, 
on a scale from I ( = guess) to 4 ( = perfect confidence). 
The same procedure was repeated with the second automaton, except 
that subjects were not specifically instructed for the second automaton and 
simply told that their task and the procedure were the same as before but 
(hat the automaton was different. 
Results 
A multivariate approach was used to analyse the repeated measures data 
statistically (O'Brian & Kaiser, 1985). The Pillai-Bartlett-V criterion, 
known for its robustness, was chosen as the multivariate test statistic 
(Olson. 1976) However, the ^-approximation to the distribution o! V is 
used in describing the results. For all analyses, the critical level of a and 
JJ was set to 0.05, which is sufficient to detect "targe effects" given N = 23 
in each of the three experimental group*. Also, for every significant effect 
partial Kh (/* J) will be reported as a measure of the proportion of variance 
explained relative to the total variance not explained by other experimental 
variables (Cohen. 1977). 
We first analysed whether the availability of an external memory had 
an influence on subjects' exploratory activities by reducmg the interference 
from similar state transitions (Hypothesis I). If this was the case, subjects 
in Groups SM and D M should have exposed themselves lo more different 
state transitions than subjects m Group NM. Table 1 (upper section) dis-
plays the relevant data. Two A N O V A s were run separately for the two 
automata with planned contrasts lo compare the memory groups to Group 
NM. The F-tests yielded significant group differences only for the small 
automaton, F(2. 65) - 3.93. R3P - 0.11 [vs. f\2. 65) < 1.38 for the com-
plex automaton); a direct comparison showed that the difference in the 
small automaton is due to Group NM's lower number of different state 
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TABLE 1 
M«an Number of Different State Transitions ar»d "Of f " States during th*» 
Exploration Phase* <o' the Three Experimental Groups and the 
Two Different Automata 
Group, 
Automaton NM SM DM 













35 8119 9) 
409(16.0) 
32 1(18.4) 
Voir- Standard deviation* arc given in pan-ntbc»e* 
transitions relative to the memory groups (r(65) ~ -2.56], whcTcas there 
is no difference between Groups SM and D M ['(65) < 1.14]. 
Table 1 also displays how many trials subjects spent wiib the automaton 
"switched o f f . which we analysed for exploratory purposes. In contrast 
to any of the other dependent variables considered here, this represents a 
possible system-specific measure of performance. A person who is better 
at acquiring the "on/off" concept should "waste" fewer intervention trials 
with the automaton switched off. For the small automaton. we find overall 
group differences, ^ 2 . 65) = 5.53, R; = 0.15. planned contrasts revealed 
significant differences between the memory groups and Group NM, 
f(65) * 3.17. but not between Groups SM and D M 1/(65) < -1.03]. For 
the complex automaton, the overall test indicated that the group means 
do not differ significantly |F[2, 65) < 1.28]. 
The data from the control task arc shown in Table 2. An A N O V A with 
group as independent factor showed that there is no significant difference 
for either the small automaton [F{2. 65) < 1.79] or the complex automaton 
[F < I ] in terms of how often subjects reached the goal state during the 
control iask. Considering, however, the low overall number of goal states 
reached and the fact that the means are in the expected direction at a 
descriptive level, one might suspect a floor effect. If one applies the optimal 
sequence of interventions for Uie small automaton, trie goal state can be 
reached 12 times during 50 intervention trials (three transitions from the 
Initial Stale SI to S8 plus one "autonomous" transition back to the initial 
state). With the complex automaton the goal state can be reached five 
times at the most. It is possible that the automata were too difficult to 
control, given the number of exptoration trials. 
The knowledge acquired about the automaton should be reflected m 
the number of correct responses on the recognition test (see Figure 5). A 
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TABLE 7 
Mean Number of Goal fitaiw Reacted during the Control 
Phaaa for the Three Experimental Group* and 
the Two Different Automata 
Groups 
Automaton m SM D M 
Small 0 7 ( 2 . 4 ) 2.6(4.3) 16(3.3) 
Complex 0.4(1-3) 0.9(1.8) 0.7(1.8) 
S'oie: Standard deviinora are given in parenlhescv 
global F-test indicates perform3nce differences on ihe small automaton 
between groups, H2. 65) = 7.23. H\ • 0.18; planned contrasts Show that 
whereas there is no difference between Groups SM and D M (f(65) < I.08], 
the difference between the memory groups and Group NM is significant, 
t(6S) m -3.<vS The memory groups have more knowledge available about 
the automaton than does the group without support. For the complex 
automaton, the global F-test yields no significant group differences 
(F< I.II). It is interesting to note that the confidence ratings that followed 
each recognition item show exactly the same pattern. For the small auto-
Small Automat/* Complex Automaton 
Q A'o carnal memory 
0 . ' " . . i d i tumuit memmy 
• [}ynnmtc external memory 
FIG. 5. Average number of correct responses in the reoopiihoo task* following the a m 
( I ) and second (2) exploration phase and use control phase (3) for the small and the complex 
automaton. The error bars rcprcaenl the standard deviaUons 
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maton, there are significant, groupcUffeseftoes.. f\2,65) =* 6.41, R{ = 0.17; 
the difference exists between the memory groups and Group NM, 
f(65) = 3 37, and there is no difference between Groups SM and D M 
[r(65) < 1 23). For the complex automaton, there are no significant group 
differences [fipj. 65) < 1-78]. 
Considering performance on the small automaton, the data seem to be 
compatible w i h Hypotheses \ and 2 (*ftfa the exception of the control 
phase) Performance benefits due to the availability of an external memory 
can be observed However. Groups SM and D M consistently do not show 
any performance differences. Thus. Hypothesis 3 can be rejected. 
In general, performance is worse on the complex automaton for both 
the number of goal states reached [fl j j , 65) * 6.33. /?J = 0.091 and the 
numbei of correct responses lo recognition items \F{\, 65) = 40.99, 
" 0.39). This pattern has been specified by Hypothesis 4. Together with 
the fact that performance benefits for the memory groups occurred only 
for the small automaton, this points to the differential utility of the external 
memory support. It was effective only when subjects interacted with the 
less complex of two otherwise very similar automata (Hypothesis 5). 
The recognition test also illustrates that subjects continuously acquire 
more knowledge about the automata. A M A N O V A with phases as within-
subjects factor and planned contrasts confirms: thai the number of correct 
responses on the recognition task Increases monotoniesily as a function of 
the number of trials on the task, f(2. 64) - 64.13, R j «• 0.67, from the 
first to the second exploration phase. F(l, 65) = 40.35, and from the first 
two exploration phases to the subsequent control p h a s e , I , 65) = 123.5b1 
A more detailed analysis of some of the items of the recognition test 
revealed that efficiency-divergency effects (Hypothesis 6) were found for 
the complex automaton, H i , 65) = 10.40, = 0.14, but not for the small 
automaton \P{1, 65) < 1.83]. This may be due to the difference in effi-
ciency as implemented in the automata. The difference is larger fur the 
critical items in the complex automaton (see Table A2). 
Tabic 3 also shows the "mode" interaction (items 3 and 4, see Table 
A3) was more difficult to understand than the "on/off" interaction (items 
5 and 6) of the input variables (see Table 3). A M A N O V A with item type 
as within-subjects factor revealed significant differences between the two 
different types of items, f ( I , 65) = 60.91. K j - 0.4S. 
Finally, our concern was whether we would find the representational 
effects specified by Hypothesis 7 in the verification task. If Ihe seriality of 
events (i.c state transitions) as experienced during exploration is mentally 
represented, then reactions to the second member of a parr of items "cor-
responding" to this seriality should be facilitated. In contrast, reaction 
times to ''contradicting" items and to the first members of Ihe pair should 
be slower. The latter items may be called "neutral" because Ihey follow a 
distractor item. Only reaction times of correct answers were entered into 
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TABLE 2 
M#BI\ Numbw a* Go*" S l t t w RMC**d during th* Corxuol 
Phase for the Three Experimental Groups and 
the Tv»o Dcfferont Automata 
Groups 
Automaton NM SM DM 
Small 0.7(2.4) 2.6(4.3) 1.6(3.3) 
Co*nple» 0.4(1.3) 0 .90-8) 0.7(1.8) 
Note: Siandard deviations s , c grverf in parenlhcsev 
global F-test indicates performance differences o n the small automaton 
between groups. F{2, 65) = 7.23. R\ = 0.18; planned contrasts show that 
whereas there is n o difference between Groups SM and D M (f(6S) < 1.08). 
the difference between the memory groups and Group NM is significant, 
1^65) « - J . 6 S . Trie memory groups have moTC VnowWdge available about 
the automaton than does the group without support. For the complex 
automaton, the global F-test yields no significant group differences 
( F < 1.11). It is mteresting to note that the confidence ratings that followed 
each recognition item show exactly the same pattern. For the small auto-
F1G 5. Average number at camiX rcaoooae* m the recognition Uaki following the ftfst 
(1) sod Kcond (2) exploration phsse and the control ph«e (3) for the small and the complex 
niimmalpn TV* - m i f r u n i w i t w r n l the i iarutanl lUviflhnm 
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maton, there are significant group differences, ftp, 65) = 6.41, «= 0.17; 
the difference exists between the memory groups and Group N M . 
f(65) = 3.37, and there is no difference between Groups SM and D M 
|f<65) < 1.23]. For the complex automaton, there are no significant group 
differences \FX2. 65) < 1.78]. 
Considering performance on the small automaton, the data seem to be 
compatible with Hypotheses 1 and 2 (with the exception of the control 
phase) Performance benefits due to the availability of an external memory 
can be observed- However. Groups SM and D M consistently do not show 
any performance differences. Thus, Hypothesis 3 can be rejected. 
In general, performance is worse on the complex automaton for both 
the number of goal states reached [F{\. 65) *= 6.33, flj = 0.09] and the 
number of correct responses to reco^oitKm items \f\\, 65) = 40.99. 
Rl « 0.39]. This pattern has been specified by Hypothesis 4. Together with 
the fact that performance benefits for the memory groups occurred only 
for the small automaton. this points to the differential utility of the external 
memory support- It was effective only when subjects interacted with the 
less complex of two otherwise very similar automata (Hypothesis 5 ) . 
The recognition test also illustrates that subjects continuously acquire 
more knowledge about the automata, A M A N O V A with phases as within-
subjects factor and planned contrasts confirms that the number of correct 
responses on the recognition task increases monotonically as a function of 
the number of trials on the task. F(2. 64) = 64.13. R\ = 0.67, from the 
first to the second exploration phase, f{\, 65) — 40.35, and from the first 
two exploration phases to the subsequent control phase, A f l , 65) = 123.58. 
A more detailed analysis of some of the items of the recognition test 
revealed that efficiency-divergency effects (Hypothesis 6) were found for 
the complex automaton, FT.1. 65) K 10.40. R;, = 0.14, but not for the small 
automaton [F(l, 65) < 1.83]. This may be due to the difference in effi-
ciency as implemented in the automata. The difference is larger for the 
critical items in the complex automaton (see Tabic A2) . 
Table 3 also shows the "mode" mtcraction (items 3 and 4, see Table 
A3) was more difficult to understand than the "on/of f ' interaction (items 
5 and 6) of the input variables (sec Table 3). A M A N O V A with item type 
as within -subjects factor revealed significant differences between the two 
different types of items, F ( l , 65) * 60.91. R$ = 0.48. 
Finally, our concern was whether we would find the representational 
effects specified by Hypothesis 7 in the verification task. If the seriality of 
events (i.e. state transitions) as experienced during exploration is mentally 
represented, then reactions to the second member of a pair of items "cor-
responding" to this seriality should be facilitated. In contrast, reaction 
times to "contradicting" items and to the first members of the pair should 
be slower. The latter items may be called "neutral" because they follow a 
distractor item. Only reaction times of correct answers were entered into 
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TAB I f 3 
Average Number of Correct Answers l o s n l l i m o n the Recognition Task Following 
the Two Exploration Phases and the Control Phass 
items j « * form* • & t> Item 0 Itrm/O 
"modi" "on/off" - efficient 
interaction interaction efficient input" input" 
Small Automawn QM 0.69 
0.83 — - — . | .5I 
Complex Automaton 1.13 — i - - 0.75 
JVofr: Maximum u three correct aiuwcr*. 
the analyses.4 Reaction times to contradicting items arc significanUyjiower 
than reaction times to corresponding items t,see Figuie fY. F[2, 51) - 4 M . 
ffj = 0.14, and f ( 2 . 54) 4.95. » 0.16. for the small and complex 
automaton, respectively). In contrast, reaction times to contradicting items 
are not different from reaction times to neutral Items (both ft < I). Pre-
senting items in their normal order facilitates their verification. These data 
are in line with Hypothesis 7. 
Discussion 
The most prevalent result of the present experiment is that the external 
memory support s h w e J beneficial cttecte on a number of different 
performance measures, but only for the less complex of two automata. It 
is suggested that this finding is best interpreted in analogy to the differential 
approach known from clinical psychology according to which we may ask 
4N<nc ihtt due • the Unuied number u*h items tome lubyscu had lo be excluded 
from the analyses because of missing values. A s » result, the degreee* of freedom for these 
i - -«-~—" * w n - o u l . t i « ™ - t «*' fhc e«'«'<« eamrif 
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which type of support system is indicated in which situation under which 
type of task demand for which type of person. Consequently, a desirable 
strategy of support system design would take into account as much as 
possible person variables, situational variables, and task variables. In the 
present case, complexity as a task variable had a differential effect on the 
utility of the support system. Subjects benefited from the external memory 
only when they explored the small automaton. 
The external support did not affect performance on the number of goal 
states subjects reached during the control phase. Thi** variable seems to 
represent a difficult aspect of the experimental task, add the results could 
reflect a floor effect. In this case giving subjects more trials to explore the 
system should reveal group differences. Alternatively, one couid develop 
more refined measures of control performance. How often subjects reach 
a certain goal state ts only a very global assessment of their control perform-
ance. It seems possible to design tasks at different levels of difficulty that 
are indicative of subjects' knowledge state (cf. Falmagne. 198*9). 
In no case was the performance of Group D M better than that of Group 
SM. This finding runs contrary to our expectations. We therefore analysed 
how often subjects In Group D M actually used the option to make a 
well-known old state the new state from which to resume exploration. It 
turned out that just about half of the subjects in Group D M (12 out of 23) 
ever used the option. Those subjects who used it did so on an average of 
only 4,1 (out of a maximum of 16) occasions. This could explain why Group 
D M did not pertoira belter than Group SM. The external memory itself 
was automatically displayed in a fixed interval of six trials. In contrast, the 
"dynamic" option was left at subjects' disposal. More importantly, there 
w*s no obvious visual reminder of the option on the screen (subjects simply 
clicked onto the desired state display m the memory window—see Figure 
4). It might be thai such design factors contributed to the fact that the 
option was mostly ignored. 
With respect to the number of different state transitions, it is interesting 
to note that the memory manipulation in this case affected a variable that 
reflects a qualitative aspect of subjects' exploratory behaviour. Our inter-
pretation of this finding is that the availability of past system states on on 
external medium reduces the interference in memory that is otherwise 
caused by state transitions that share identical elements of the S, / -.v... 
triple. 
The efficiency-divergency effect had been demonstrated for the complex 
automaton only. This could be due to the somewhat smaller efficiency 
divergency difference between the critical inputs in the small automaton. 
If the interpretation is correct, the finding indicates (hat exploring an 
unknown device parallels a complex choice situation in that subjects prefer 
actions that imply more alternatives but lead to a goal less efficiently com-
pared to actions that are more efficient but less divergent. 
1 0 8 BUCHNEfi A N D FUNKE 
Reaction times to state transitions in the verification task yielded usefuf 
information about how discrete dynamic systems might be represented. If 
(he second item of a pair was a state transition that in the chronology of 
system events occurred after the first item, reaction times were faster than 
when the second item had actually occurred before the first member of the 
pair The faciiitativc effect indicates that serials i> is .in import ant aspect 
of how experience with a dynamic system is mentally represented. This 
could have implications for the development of new diagnostic procedures 
to assess system knowledge more adequately. In the present experiment, 
the items in the diagnostic phases were independent, and their sequence 
was randomized. In addition, they were static, presenting S„ / „ and the 
new (to be recognized) S<,, at the same time. Thus, one possible con-
sequence for the further development ot diagnostic procedures could be 
to probe subjects' knowledge with sequences of items that correspond to 
the chronology of system events. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this paper was to illustrate how a welElaborated theor-
etical background such as the theory of finite-state automata can provide 
the basis for an interesting experimental paradigm in research on know-
ledge acquisition and knowledge application using computer-simulated 
"microworlds". More specifically, the approach can be helpful in con-
structing classes of task environments that can be compared with respect 
to formal characteristics, and it facilitates the direct manipulation of such 
characteristics by providing a common formal background. We have also 
argued thai the formalism for describing automata can be used to select 
plausible psychological hypotheses about, toe instance, how fcarning-by-
exploration may proceed, and how system information is represented. 
Another interesting aspect of the approach is that it directly suggests a 
number of methods to assess a person's knowledge about a system. These 
methods are both general in the sense that they can be applied to any 
automaton (e.g. "prognostic questions"), and related to "classical" meas-
ures of memory like cued recall, recognition, or verification tasks. Such 
items may be either randomly sampled from the state transition matrix, or 
they may be selected to cover critical features of the task environment. 
The latter procedure has been used in the recognition task in the present 
experiment. With respect to the verification task, we would like to point 
out that methods of "mental chronometry" (Posner, 1978), which have up 
to now been absent in this research domain, were shown to be applicable 
to assessing the way system information is represented in memory. 
In addition, finite-state automata theory provides a criterion for optimal 
performance that is essential for evaluating a person's system control 
behaviour. However, other performance measures are also readily avail-
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able For instance, wc nave attempted to demonstrate that the number of 
different state transitions a person decide* to explore can be an interesting 
dependent variable. Another example could be to compare recognition 
items covering transition* that have actually been explored to items cov-
ering transitions thai have not. This procedure may (urn out to be useful 
for assessing generalization processes such as a person's discovery of an 
"ON/OFF" or "mode" interaction. To conclude this point, we would like 
to argue that these more general merhods of knowledge assessment arc a 
rather attractive alternative to idiosyncratic diagnostic procedures thai are 
directly derived from task parameters such as "production output" (e.g. 
Dorner. 1987; Morris & Rouse. 1985). 
We also wish lo emphasize the parallels between finite-state automata 
and finite grammars (e.g. Chomsky & Miller, 1958). Finite grammars 
generate structured event sequences such as sentences over an alphabet, 
whereas finite state automata "understand" these sequences This suggests 
a close relationship between tasks that involve identifying the structure of 
an automaton and tasks that require subjects to process material that was 
generated by a finite grammar (e.g. Brooks, 1978; Dulany, Carlson. A 
Dewey. 1984; Rcbcr. 1989). 
Of course, using a finite-state automata framework in experimental 
psychology is nol an entirely new idea. Suppes (1969). for instance, 
suggested the use of automata theory ax a theoretical background for mod-
elling animal and human behaviour Another application of automata 
theory is the construction of machine prototypes and the analysis of human 
effort to reach certain goals. Such analyses were done by B&sser and 
Mclchior (1992). However, the potential of automata theory as a frame-
work for generating classes of dynamic task environments and aprwopnalc 
diagnostic instruments has to our knowledge not been outlined before. 
The most serious problem of the finite state automata approach to 
human interaction with dynamic systems probably is one of system com-
plexity. In principle, it is possible to design discrete dynamic systems of 
any complexity.5 However, there is a practical upper limit in terms of 
computer memory and computational effort as well as in terms of the effort 
it takes the experimenter to construct very large state transition matrices. 
For instance, the simulation of a complicated industrial production process 
dearly is beyond the capability of the approach- This limitation certainly 
reduces the applicability of the discrete systems framework. 
We can see two partial remedies to the problem: (I) It may not be 
necessary to simulate the entire complexity of a learning environment to 
investigate the basic cognitive processes involved in interacting with It. 
' h should be noiod ituii mow so-called "continuous" sys tem are w principle discrete in 
thai ibey accept «* input and display as output only discrete rramberv O n the other hand. • 
docxete lyMemi' output may appear continuous if it haa * sutiicirn 11 v large number of leveh. 
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Depending on the system, it could be possible to omit certain details or 
simulate only parts of the system as long as "simulation fidelity" (Hays & 
Singer. 1989) can be preserved. (2) A second aspect is that some of the 
advantageous properties of the approach, such as the diagnostic procedures 
and representational assumptions discussed above, can be utilized as long 
as one conceives ot the system in terms of a finite-state automaton. The 
actual implementation may be quite different. 
Yet another problem common to many approaches to human interaction 
with complex dynamic task environments is finding the proper level of 
abstraction for characterizing a device For the case of learning about an 
entirely n e * device, we have assumed that different states, interventions, 
and next states must become associated. In this situation learning occurs 
on the level of physical events in the automaton. After some experience, 
however, individual slate transitions may be combined into chunks. Such 
chunks may he "horizontal" combinations of transitions into routines to 
get a system reliably from one state to a distant state, or they may be 
"vertical" combinations across, for example, a specific intervention like an 
"ON/OFF" switch. The problem of developing an adequate model for such 
abstraction processes is aggravated by the fact that concepts may be avail-
able at different degrees of abstraction. Concepts at different degrees of 
abstraction enable more experienced learner* to attend to (and. hence, 
control) a task at different levels. Naturally, if a person has prolonged 
experience with attending to a task at a high level of abstraction, it may 
be difficult and effortful to recollect individual stales and interventions 
when required to do so, either outside (he context of the immediate control 
process or if an unexpected event, hke a failure, interrupts an ongoing 
procedure. This is assumed because nomalty *hat we are able to recall is 
information we actively attend to (Kellog, 1980; Norman. 1969). Moray 
(1990), for instance, has presented a "lattice theory" designed to describe 
such abstraction phenomena occurring at different levels. He does not, 
however, make any assumptions about cognitive processes involved in 
abstraction, nor does he specify how shifts between different levels of 
abstraction* might occur. 
The processes underlying abstractions of the type described here will 
certainly need more attention in the future. Nevertheless it can be 
interesting to analyse learning processes at the elementary level of state 
transitions- In another study (Buchner & Fuflke, 1991). we investigated 
early learning in and transfer of associations between finite-state automata. 
After initially acquiring knowledge about a "source automaton" (a 
simplified radio wilh a Vnrilt-m alarm device), several groups of subjects 
performed on different "target automata" The state transition matrices 
underlying the target automata were identical for all groups but completely 
different from that of the source automaton. The automata differed with 
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respect to the labelling of their input and output signals. In one condition 
these labels were entirely new, whereas in a different condition the original 
labels had been preserved. If learning indeed occurs at the level of associ-
ating states, interventions, and next states, the latter case should corres-
pond to the A - B , A Br situation in paired associate learning (cf. Martin. 
1965). Stimuli and responses from the first list are preserved in the transfer 
list except that they are repaired. This is known to produce considerable 
negative transfer. In accordance with our expectations. It was observed 
that those subjects performed worst that interacted with the target auto-
maton in which the originally associated elements were preserved but were 
also repaired (due to an entirely different transition matrix). 
In summary, there are definite problems and limitations that come with 
the approach we advocated for in this paper. However, we believe that its 
attractive features make it worth exploring further the applicability to 
research using dynamic task environments. In this sense the finite-state 
automata approach could provide an interesting additional way of address-
ing problems of human knowledge acquisition and knowledge use in 
dynamic tasks, and it could have the potential to stimulate research in Ihc 
area. 
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TABLE A3 
Recognition Itnms U*»d In the Diagnostic Phase* 
Small Automaton Complex Automaton 
1- • 
Item 
c Si > c* •Jr. | C ommmt s. 
I 1 i 3 t - O O C - * t O O C 37 8 
i * 
•iti 
2 2 2 2 Code —Code 38 7 41 
3 2 6 5 Code — HCU (mode interaction) H 1 1 
4 7 6 Code --» ECU (mode interaction) 20 10 23 
5 9 9 Code — OFF (on/off interaction) 38 II 46 
« 9 9 E C U — OFF(on/oH interaction; 10 11 46 
7 1 4 ECU - ECU (recursion) 23 5 23 
1 3 7 E C U — ECU (recursion) 34 2 34 
t 5 5 E C U — ECU (lea* eftiaeni) 6 1 8 
10 6 6 ECU — ECU (moreefficient) 1 3 5 
Nov f The mimben ot the i i i m jnO input signals rcter TO rbe state transition mninccs 
depicted in Tables A I and A 2 The "Coiflmeni" column illustrate* which functional o p e d 
of the automaton b reflected in the item 
